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"It must be emphasized,

at
the

11

said Reichsmiriister Albert Speer

the Linz.armaments·meeting of 24 June 1944, "that coal is

.basis for everything.necessary in war. 111

it w~s indeed.

For _Hitler's war

Apart from the customary uses, it had to compen-

sate ·for the Reich's petroleum deficit .. More than nine-tenths
of the Reich's 1937 energy consumption was_derived from coal
as oppos~d, for instanri~, to slightly less than half in the
Unitsd States.

The synthetics industries sponsored by the Four

Year Plan were, not surprisingly, predicated on the consumption
of coal as a raw material.

ccial was also normally the largest

German export commodity by value and therefore critical as a
s·ouree of precious foreign exchange earnings.

war

Germah

Coal fueled the

effort itself to an extent which seemed to the econo-

mist~ 6£ the United States Strategic Bombing Survey altogether
.

.

.

disproportionate.

2

!t'is, then, obvious that after 1937 a break, or even a··
sharl'.) d~clihe, in German coal output, 70% of which was normally

mined irl.the Ruhr Valley (Ruhrgebiet), would have had catastro:phic batl~eqbences for Hitler's stra~egy of aggressibn.

tdr coal did
from that year

Excessive

demahcl

in fact give rise to a chronic crisis situa-

tion

until the en:d of the war.

tion!:l

iri coke

consumption had to be edicted in Spring 1939 to

ease E4Hd:tt.ages.

Coal supply became a matter of critical urgency.

in tHg Wihters of 1941-1942 .and 1942-1943.
.

'

'

Temporary reduc-

The breakdown in
-

rail}H~J l~an~portation beginning in May 1944 resulted in coal
~horlMJMw Which everitually crippled the war economy.

Coal.

2

production, on the other hand, never became a bottleneck in it.
The Ruhr coal industry operated at record levels from 1937 on,
with output in that year of approximately 127 million T, 4
million T above the previous high of 1929.

Output was virtually

the same the following year, then rose· to 129 million T in 19401941 and 1941-1942, and in 1942-1943 reached.an historic high of
131.2 million T.

For the calendar year 1943 it was 135 million T.

The declines thereafter were due to enemy action.
The record outputs of 1937-1943 repr~sent a remarkable
feat.

They occurred without benefit of new t~chnologies, signi-

ficant capital investment, or additions to the German labor
force (which in fact decreased by 45,"000 men during these years)
but rather entirely by dint of more thorough utilization of it.
Twenty-four work days per month was the rule in 1937, 1938, and
to.August 1939, when for the first time since World War I,
twenty-seven were worked.

From then until the end

twenty-six days per month was.the norm.

of

the war,

On 1 April 1939, .work

hours were raised from nine per day to nine and three-quarters,
with a total

11

shift-timen (Schichtzeit), including entry and

exit, bf ten and one-half hours. 3

The output increases also

involved a significant "upgrading" of labor skills, and in this
particular sense:

during the war •itself tens of thousands.of
.

.

German. miners (Hauer) transformed themselves from production
workers to supervisors of the slave laborers brought in to do .
.
.
.
menial lab~~·in the pits~ The.example of Rtihr doal, in short,
.

lends credenc~

.,

to Speer 1 s remarks of 9 June 19~4 before the

3

magnates of Ruhr heavy industry:

"This 'armaments miracle,'

which has enabled us to achieve further production increases in

r
the face of mounting serial attacks has, as its most important
presupposition, the soldierly bearing of our German workers. 114
But how is it to be explained?

The historical study of

labor relations under national socialism is still in its infancy,
/

and may well have been set off on the wrong foot by the man
whose influence utterly overshadows it.· Timothy Masori's 173
_-

-

5

page introduction to Arbeiterklasse unn Volksgemeinschaft,

-

the

·most recent of his voluminous writings on the subject, presents
a large number of highly theoretical arguments in support of the
proposition that "class conflict" was the "ftindamental reality"

I
I'
'I

- i
I

of German life during the Third Reich and therefore central to
labor ielations as well.
look for it.

Ruhr coal provides a good place to

In mariy parts of the world coal districts have

provided cl~ssic scenes rif labor-management confrontation,. and
the period 1933~1945 is no exception.

British coal production

fell from 231 million T. in 1939 to 184 million T in 194_4,
average daily marishift output of face workers from 3.00 T to

2.70 T.

These results occurred in spite of an increase of 11%

in the amount of coal cut mechanically.

Industrial relations,

;;

I,

poor at the war's outbreak, worsened ~teaclily during_it.

In 1939

612,000 man-days were lost to "industrial stoppages~ and daily
absenteeism was at a tate of 6.4%.

_In 1944 the correspondinq

figutes increased to 2,495,000 and 13.6%.

In the United States,

wildcat striking-began in January 1943 and continued throuqh

4

November of that year.

As many as 500,000 workers were involved.

These events had no counterpart in the Ruhr, where' no organized
resistance or even statistically perceptible acts of individual
sabotage took place.

"Clas~ con1lict," while in some sense doubt-

less present, had no measurable effect on coal production.
Hitler's vaunted Volksgemeinschaft, on the other hand, was,
at least ~t th~ mines, a palpable sham.

11

Labor idealism," such
i'

i

as nazi propaganda had hoped to inspire, was conspicuous by its
absence.

6

The influence

fact slight.

of

the Party and its ancillaries was in

This circumstance should cause little surprise.

I'

I'

Under Hitler, industry, i~ return for supporting the aims of the
regime, was allowed to n;m its own affairs.
.self-administration"

So-called "industrial

(industrieller Selbstverwal tung) was the rule,

and labor relations were no exception to

ii.

of the regime echoed its express desires:

The main enactments

strikes were outlawed,

unions disappeared, and wages. were frozen.

In addition, the

Third Reich gave management an- opportunity to inculcate labor
with its own philosophy, namely, that work itself is the supreme
virtue, and production all that counts.

The record Ruhr coal

outpu~achieved between 1937 and 1943 can be .taken as evidence
that it succeeded in the effort.
Hitler led Germany into war without benefit of workable
mobilization policies for either coal or labor.

J

[,

Coal planninq,

in any meaningful sense of the word, was simply absent.

"Unfor~

tunately,". sai.d Speer, "we did not pay sufficient attention to
coal production before. the war.

.' !

. ;

We built up coal-'devouring

I'

i

5

.

.

.

.

''

.

industries such as chemicals but presumed that coal output at
pre-war levels would do. 117

The Ruhr mines were virtually over-

looked in the investment programs of the Four Ye~r Plan.

8

There

was not even an adequate mechanism to allocate the insufficient
amounts that could be produced.

The regulatory machinery set up

in 1919 was simply allowed to fall into disuetude.

Ii

The appoint-

ment in earlyl940 of Paul Walter as Coal Commissar represented
the single, and belated, attempt to impose central control over
alloriation and production.
failure a year ·1ater.

It had, however, to be abandoned in

Reichsvereinigung Kohle {RVK) was then set
''

''
. '

up to fill ,the breach.

It was an industry-run affair, a confirma'

tion of sorts that it alone was in a position to manage the coal

i

.l
'

I

problems arising from the war.
Labor mobilization, although the subject of much theoretical
planning, faced insurmountable institutional handicaps.
approach had to be dismissed from the outset.

One

General labor

conscription~--in any case normally a wartime measure---was

I

''i !
'

recognized as being politically risky as well as administratively
unworkable.

Labor allocation through the market was also extre-

mely difficult because of the wage freezes in effect after April
1934.

Expedients therefore had to be adopted to deal with the

labor shortages.

Promotions of a purely nominal character pro-

vided one means of granting "Unofficial" wage increases.

j,

I

The

Price Commissioner did grant them officially in a few especially·
pressing cases, but the procedures of his office were too cumbersome to be u,sed often.

Critical cases normally gave rise to

I''

6

directive restraints on labor mobility and compulsory transfers
(Dienstverpflichtung).

The wage freezes also caused a deep and

pervasive employee morale problem, for they deprived wage and.
salary earners of their "rightful share" in the ~~tionil income
~··,- ...-

9

,

It actually declined from 56.6 in 1929 to 51.8 in

increases.
1939.

--

Nazi labor organizations in fact never had more than a

shadow existence.

Th~re was, tobe sure, no shortage of them.

Their names litter the. hi';,itoryj of the Third Reich:

National-

sozialistische Bet:i;_l,~bs~ellenorganisatiori, Treuhaender der
4

Arbeit, and, abov~·,

~:f-,,,,
· De,utscb~
'.,/····

Arbeitsfront (DA~) ---the crea'

.

tion of Robert;/Ley..
.

.It

Ley was a master bureaucrat:

author of the

-

Volkswagenprc5jekt, temporary administrator

(through his stand-in,

Walter) of the coal' f~dustry,. and chief .houser and feeder of
foreign· s·lave laborers.

Because his organization could not bar.,

I

gsi:in, however,
its influence in industrial relations was l.i\mited
.

;\·, :>

i.O} j

'

±q propagandizing.
\i

I

·

.

Its·usefulness as an instrument of lab~rl
·

,

... J

ir"ncl>bilization (as for instance was the. case with British uniqTls
,";.•!

;during both World Wars) was nil.

As for Ley, his memory is. ·1

1:·§sociated with little more than a string of joke-words:

K,;i;-aft

,,J

idurch Freude, Schoenhei t der Arbeit, Leistungswettkaempfe,
'',·

..

·l

!

'-·,,,·;.:]

.

.

.

.

Musterbetr1ebe, and Werkspiele.

.

The Bergassessoren -. (9perators) _ were not weil-positioned to
make good the deficiencies in coal mobilization policy.

Their

conservative, indeed rigid, frame of mind if it ruled out (on
patriotic grounds) op~osition to Hitler, also made cooperation
with him difficult.

'

As was the case during Weimar, the Ruhr

7

,

I

coal industry fought a running battle with the 'government in the
years after 1933.

It concerned the terms of the sales syndicate

merger with the Saar and Aachen districts, compensation payments
for exports, railroad rates and changes in them, sale prices to
Four Year .Plan projects, cartel pricing policy, delivery priori·ties, allocations to the mines, and labor questions generally.
Ruhr coal was, if anything, the least popular branch of industry
with the policy-makers in Berlin, and the only one ever to have
been put under commissarial administration.

Its official repre-

sentatives, the Referent'in.the.Bergbauabteilung of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium and, after June 1941, RVK Chief Pleiger
received harsh treatment not only at the hands of Speer and Kehrl
but from third-raters such as General von Hanneken.

Demands for

the special consideration appropriate to its problems received,
on the whole, short shrift. 10
Labor constituted the biggest portion of.the coal mobil:C~atic:m problem.
tion,

11

At· prevailing technologies of "partial mechaniz.a-

it comprised some three-fifths of tota,l production costs,

t~e highest proport{on for any branch of indtistry.

The poor·

financial condition of Ruhr coal ruled out a shift to "full
.J

.

mechanization" such as occurred after World War II.

It requfred

not only the introduction of new machinery-~~mechanical cutterscrapers, .loaders, and.conveyors---but the widening of shafts

I
'

and tunnels and the construction at the surface of more powerful
'

steam generators.

The effort to introduce "full mechanization"

ste·p~by-step, begun in the late-1920' s with the Schraemmaschine,

I

8

had proved by the Depression to be a costly failure, and the
·
·
11
number of such machines in use actually declined thereafter.

During the 1930's gains in both production and productivity

:i
I
I!
'

could in fact only be made by adding to the size of the labor
force, reassignment of working places (Abbaubetriebspunk~e),
intensified exploitation, and "upgrading" of skills.

Each of

these ~pptoaches was adopted at different times and with different degrees of success.

The reduction of Abbaubetriebsounkte

. j
i

had in fact begun during the Depression, which brought a drop

I
!'

from 12,500 in 1929 to 3,669 by the end of 1934, and continued,
.
·12
albeit at a reduced rate, until 1938, with 3,280 in operation.
This concentration process is probably behind the improvements

I

I I

in m~n-shift produdtiviti from- 1,271 kg in 1928, a r~cord year,
to 1,547 kg in 1937.

:

I

I

I

To increase output significantly above the

.theoretical ~full .operating capacity" level of 125 million T
''

per year required_additions to the mine labor force.

Miner re-

I I
, I

cruitment therefore became the critical problem facing the

industry after 1937.

I I

I'

I

For failure in this respect left open---

given existing political realities~--o_nly -two alternatives.

The

first of them, to overwork the existing mine labor force, could
only provide a temporary solution to the coal shortage problem.
_i'

The second,. the more or less forcible employment of foreign_
-

-

.

labor, was fraught with unknown risks ·for both security and the
_production process.

Its ultfmate success'was due to a possibility

unforeseen .by the reqime, the operators or the miners
themselves:

the l'upgrading" of their skills to include

9

responsibility for labor management as well as production .
. An uphill battle had to be waged to step up the recruitment
of mine labor.

Coal mining, never an attractive career, was

becoming less so.

The work itself was physically demanding,

dirty, and hazardous.

The pneumatic pick (Abbauhammer) had
From 1925 to 1945 some

added significantly to its hardships.

85-90% of Ruhr cbal was mined annually with this bone-jarring
instrument, the highest rate of any coal mining district in the
world.

Its use joined the breakneck pace of mechanized opera-

tions with the heavy muscle strain of manual labor, caused
severe daily aches and pains and was, over the long run, physic\

ally and psychologically debilitating.

the industry held it

responsible for destroying miner tradition, a reflection of
. which was seen in the shrinkage of the Stammbelegschaft* after

1925.

Miners, numerous surveys confirmed, counselled their.sons
.

.

· .. · · .
13
to pursue any career but·their own.
Pay and benefits had, moreover, ceased to serve as incentives to entry into the mining profession.

Traditionally, t~e
'

••

I

~ndustry had been more concerned with retention than recrutt~ent
inasmuch as mine labor is artisanal in character and requires
years of on-:-the-job training.

'

.

.

Thus the development long befbre

.

*The. term, which lacks ant English equiva1ent, means.
literally." trunk employees' II . those' in other words,
working on a.more or less permanent basis and :tncluding supervisors (Steiger), technical personnel, as
·well as most face-:-workers (Hauer).

10

World War I of special miner welfare institutions:

the Knapp-

schaften for medical and accident insurance, the Bergmannssiedlungen to provide subsidized housing near the pit-head, and so
on.

The industry recognized, at the same time, that. the harsh

nature of the miner's work necessitated paying hi~ at the highest
prevailing rates for skilled labor.

The trends of the interwar

period, however, worked against the effectiveness of both parts
of this compensation policy.

State insurance benefits were,

first of all, extended throughout industry, thus ending the
special attractiveness of the arrangements in coal.

The industry

was, at the same time, required to pay into the new system while
remaining saddled with the high overhead costs of the old one.
This fact, toqether with the falling yield per ton of coal after
1928, made it increasingly difficult for {t to grant pay
increases .. Miner wage:primacy had ali but_ disappeared by 30
h
l
· l prices,
•·
. 14
Apri·1 1934
·.
wen
waaes, a.ong
w1t1
were f rozen.

The

industry 1 s situation did not fundamentally change afte~ the
seizure 0£ power.

Although sales increased, yields did not.

Ruhr coal I s returns on capital remai_ned the lowest of any major
branch of industry, and its earnings, if the operators are to be
believed, barely sufficed to cover amortizations.

15

These facts

perhaps explain the extraordinary vehemence of the industry's
opposition to the regimets one serious effort to deal with the
.·

.

.

seyere coal shortages £elt in Winter 1938-1939, which restilted in
the ~ublication on·l April 1939 of the Verordnung des Beatiftragten fftr den Vierjahresplan zur Erhoehung der Foerderleistung_ ·

11

und des Leistungslohnes im Bergbau.

It included a productivity

bonus in addition to extending the work day forty-five minutes.
Al though the impact of the· measure differed somewhat from mine
to mine, most Betriebsffihrer held that it provided windfalls to
the fortunate few and demoralized the rest. 16

The increase of

15-16% it brought in total Hauer earnings could not, however,
have been much of an incentive.

The fact of the matter is that

i

l'I,'

,,

. the skewed supply situation resulting from price controls had
effectively immobilized much of his purchasing power.

Miners

complained that they needed food but could only buy refrigera-

t ors.,17

Extra hours spent on the job also meant correspondingly

fewer to devote to income supplementing.

i,

;1

Miners normally devoted
I,

the bulk of their leisure time to raising vegetables and domestic

I·I
I

animals for personal consumption.

The catastrophic fall in pig-

raii;dng (Schweinehaltung) by 1939 is but one index of decline in
miner living standards.

18

Thus nominal earnings became increas-

i,

i:

I

I'

ingly irrelevant as.a guide to standards of living.
Mine employment, finally, lacked social prestige and offered
little opportunity for social mobility.

The industry neither

expanded nor evolved technologically between 1925 and 1945.
Promotions were comparatively infrequent.
moreover,· to

a

Miners were subject,

,,
I

quasi...:.:rnilitaryform of discipline in which harsh-

ness of language and even physical punishment were everyday, if
much resented, realit.ies.

Prospective brides ranked coal mining

as the very least desirable of careers for would-be mates.

The

·results of an August 1938 survey conducted by Arbeitsamt Bochum

12

should have been predictable.

Of the 970 Bochum school-leavers

whose fathers were miners, only 114 would consider entering the
pits.

Of 577 essays written, only 2·3 indicated a willingness to

do so.

Of those remaining, 297 described a mining career as too

dangerous; 239 ·as ill-paid; 150 as too physically demanding; 157
as uninteresting; 86 reported adverse reactions from accidents
to friend and family, 103 objections of father; 224 fear of
health haza-rds; 28 aversion to low status; 75 concern with inade"personal unsuitability. 1119

quate benefits; and the rest

The recruitment efforts of 1937-1939 ended in dismal failure.
It proved impossible to compete in a tight labor market against
the Ruhr armaments industry, the Reichswerke Hermann Goerinq,
and even the Autobahn and Westwall construction jobs of Organisation: Todt.

The underground labor force increased in size from

approximately 290,000 to only 310,000 in these years.

At the

2
same time, an alarming numbe:r of key technicians left. O

Worse,

there was an overall decline in thi quality of the labor force.
Reports on the.calibre of miner-recruits are simply appalling.

!:,
i:
!'

To cite a typical example:

11

[School] counsellors are the most

i

11

J

important persons directing youths to the mines.

Most come, how-

ever, in the face of express opposition from parents, as.well as

,,

['

over their own protests, and are, in addition, predominantly
young persons whose inferior capabilities are s~ch that they
.
b e. emp 1 oye d .
cannot ot h erw1.se

f

.

. Sub"
. ..
sequenL. entries o._f young

people from other professions.have become unusually :tare.and
are normally due to failure. 1121 · The age str11cture of the labor

,,
}'

13

force worsened at the same time.

As of June 1939, the 14-21 age

i

group was but 52%. of its theoretically normal size; the 22-25

i

age group, 29%; the 26-30 age group, 27%.

The older age groups
. . .
22
were oversized: · 31-35, 141%; 36-40, 158 %; 41-45, 114 %; etc.
The preponderance of old men naturally grew during the war.

As
I

i :

for the health of the mine labor force, it had visibly deter-

I

i

iorated as early as summer 1938.

According to one Dr. Steckel-

berg, whose opinion-is echoed in a plethora of reports compiled
at t'his time, "The excessive demands being' made on the physical
·strength of the miners cannot continue for any length of time
without running the danger that, soon, not only the health of
the individual but the productive process itself will be dis.
. 23
turbed."
The operators generally agreed with medical opinion.
At a meeting of 8 October 1938 summoned to deal with the problem
of miner health, "Herr Rocker (Harpen Mine) mention~d that many
hard-workin1 people had come to him to .plea that they were too
~xhaust~~ to work any more. · He could not believe that these
people were 'faking it' in order to be excused from work but
were rather really exhausted ... He expected, because of the heavy
strains being made on miners, that their exhaustion would
worsen.

1124

The strains of the work, when-added to the inadequacy of
incentives, made miner morale a pressing concern after 1937.

It

was poor and, if left unchecked, could well have disrupted production.

'The symptom of it was the phenomenon known as

"malingering

11

(Bumrnelei).

It was a "catch-all" for a wide

I

i:

'I

','

i;
''

range of misbehavior:

laziness on the job~ unexcused absences

from work, and feigned illness.
detect,

Although often diffi6ult to

the usual increase in the number of unexcused absences

i
I
: :

following paydays and on Mondays was proof positive of its existence.

The contagion was not, however, allowed to spread.

Rates

'

of both sickness and absence, excused and unexcused, do not
differ significantly from those of 1929.

On the average day in

1929 5.91% of the work force reported sick and another 1.55%
were absent.;

1.69%.

25

The corresponding figures for 1938 were 5.85% and

Bummelei indeed infected but a small group, the long-

term unemployed _hired after 19 3 6.
Management was mainly responsible for having quarantined it.
No other authority was in a position to have done so.

By 1937

DAF had been effectively jockeyed out of power at the mines.
The process was by no mean~ easy~

DAF had _a special concern

.with Ruhr mine workers who, in addition to comprising the largest
employee group in the Reich· (and one out of every five employees
!

in the Ruhr), were particularly hard-hit by the Depression.
Total mine employment, 375,711 in 1929; had reached only 235,329
by 1939.

As late as August of that year, the industry was

unable to provide even twenty-one work days a month wµich, in
the view of Gauleiter Terboven, was not enough to provide a
living waqe.
relief action"
tion.26

He therefore launched a "large-scale emergency
(gro~szueg~ge Hilfsaktion) to rectify the situa-

The political reports (Stimmungsberichte) of Gau Essen

for 1934 and 1935 depicted miner rriorale as sinqularly poor.

DAF

'

15

''

:I

I'

i'

I'
II

therefore took special pains to provide spiritual sustenance.
In Ley•s May Day speech of 1935, he likened the heroism of miners
i'

to that of. seafarers, and promised to· introduce an "Ehrentag des

''

''
I

Bergarbeiters."

The press organ of Gau Essen, Der Ruhr Arbeiter,

I

I'
I

contained, as a regular feature, a column addressed, supposedly,
to his special needs, "Hier Spricht der Bergmann!"

27

The opera-

: I

I

tors nonetheless regarded all such efforts as presumptuous,

I'
:

meddlesome, and in qeneral, Bergfremd.*

'

While by no means averse

to using DAF as agent .or i~termediary, they steadfastly opposed
its efforts to establish an organizational presence at the mines.

.

'

The attitude of Bergassessor Kellermann of Gutehoffnungshuette
was characteristic.

I:

As Vorsitzender of the Rheinisch-Westfaelisches

Kohlensyndikat after 1935, he was also the leading figure in the
industry.

He refused, among other things, to join the DAF

committee on professional ethics (Berufsmoral), place a ban on
the hiring of non-DAF members, require·payrnent of dues to it or
allow for their collection on company time, and provide the
Vertrauensrat (works council) with either office·6r telephone.
He objected to the summoning of factory formations

(Betriebsappelle)
i

as well as participation in May Day parades, social drinking with

I'

employees (Kamaradschaftsabende), factory competitions (Musterbetriebe) ,

11

skills battles"· {Leistun9_swettkaempfe) , and factory

psychodramas (Werkspiele).

As Chief of RWKS he even refused to
2

have any direct dealings with DAF. 8'

''

He delegated responsibility

for "social questions" to an operator with good- Party connections,
:

~rnst Tengelmann_of Hiberni~ Mine, and the latter deserves credit

i

I

* ( n alien to the mines II)
I

I:

16

for having, on the whole, kept OAF at "arm's length ·and, when
11

necessary, putting it.in the service of the industry.
OAF was particularly helpful in eliminating political dissi.

.

dence at the mine, both

11

.

left 11 and "right" wirig varieties.

Thanks to its interventions, the Vertrauensrat at Concordia Mine
was, for instance, made subservient to the production chief
(Betriebsfuehrer).

Vertrauensraete, successors to Betriebsraete,

were particularly important in ·the coal industry because of the
group piecework basis for wage calculation (Gedinge).
so~ewhat as follows:

It worked

a miner (Hauer) normally belonged to a work

gang assigned a specific job for which a produc.tion quota would
be set.·
falls.

Premiums were paid for exceeding it, penalties for shortMuch, however, depended on the bounties or niggardliness

of nature---Bergmatmsglueck.

Confidence in the equitability of

rate-setting was therefore·critical to work morale.

The

Beiriebsr~te existed in part to air gr~evances c6nnected with it,
and the VertrauensrM.te continued to serve this function.
could also serve as a conduit for management policy.

It

The

Concordia Betriebsrat elections of April 1933, the last ones
for twelve years, had mixed results.

The communists received

17.4% of the vote; the Social Democratic "Alter Verband,
the Christlicher Verband, 34.5%; and th~ nazis, .24.5%.
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11

23.5%;
The

elimination of communist and socialist representatives from the
Betriebsrat--~a foregone conclusion-~-required only the order of
the Betriebsfuehrer.

The nazi-workers, organized as units of

NSBO, presented management with a more severe problem, for they ·.

• I

17

demanded the right to make all appointments to it.

Betriebs-

fuehrer Meuthen eventually solicited the intervention of
Parteigenosse Staubach of Gauf.achamt Bergbau who, after a certain
.

.

amount of dithering, denounced the nazi workers as ":mutinous" and

. I

I

expelled them from the Vertrauensrat.

The Betriebsfuehrer subse-

quently set up~ new one composed of "conservatives 11 and obedient
nazis.

3

°

Cooperation between manag~ment ~nd even the reconstituted

Vertrauensrat was often difficult.

In two particulars, however,

it proved to be very significant indeed:

in suppressing Burnrnelei

and integrating foreign slave labor into the production process.
The initiative for dealing with Bummelei, at Concordia as
elsewhere, came from management.

The problem itself had been

anticipated as the inevitable consequence of the return to work
of the long-term unemployed.

·concordia's annual report for 1937

noted that, over th~ year,
"The employee structure has been fundamentally altered.
Instead of working with people who have been schooled
and trained to work together, we must make do with
persons who often have been unemployed for six or seven
years and have become unaccustomed to work.· Many of them
are,embittered and have no comprehension whatsoever of
the ideai incorporated in the Labor Regulation Law, of
cooperation between leadership and followership.
It is
evident that here only one thing can help, a painful
process of education. But the fast pace of work leaves
no time for it! 11 31
Because manpower was in short supply and work incentives were
inadequate, little could~ in fact, be done to deal with the problem of Bumrnelei.

At first, pay was docked at· Concordia:

on~-half day for the initial offense, a full day for the second.
The third one wa~ to result in dismissal.

These penalties had

,I

I

18

no effect.

32

Indeed, "The recently hired people were often glad

.
,,33
t o b e sac k e d once again.

In July 1937 Dir. Dechamps of Con-

cor~ia succeeded, through the Bezirksgruppe, in convincinq the
Treuhaender der Arbeit to deduct unexcused absences from vacation
time.

By the end of that year, however, it had in any case

ceased to exist in all but name.

And the practice of withholding

heavy labor rations (Schwerstarbeiterzulage) from Bummelanten
proved to be useless for the obvious reason that it reduced
physical strength.
p{inishment.

Thus recourse had to be made to exemplary

Summonings before Betriebsappelle having proved_

ineffective, Concordia's management, through Pg. Staubach of
Gaufachamt Bergbau_,_ enlisted the aid of the local Gestapo agent,
Lewinski.

On 4 December 1939, members of the Vertrauensrat

sinqled out to him ,supposedly "notorious malingerers" as the
. latter entered the shower rooms (Waschkaue) after work.
of them were, as intended, shipped off to Dachau.

34

Several

Doubtless

similar individual actions took place at other mines before disci-

plinary procedures were standardized in March 1940.

35

From then

on, incidents of Bummelei were to be referred immediately to DAF
which, if it so desired,- could
sible state-police office"

pass them on to the "respon-

(staatspolizeiliche

Leitstelle) with

a recommendation of mere "warning," ten to twenty-one day deten.

.·

tion · at an "education camp," or· immediate 17eferral- to a
·
- ·
·
36
Konzentrationslager.
Both manaqements and Vertrauensraete
· .qenerally agreed, however, that these procedures were hopelessly
bureaucratic and altogefher inadequate.

At the meeting of the

19

Guteh6ffnungshue~te Veitrauan~rat ~f 26 August 194li t&e Production Chief, Lennings, noted that he
".~. could not do much to suppress disloyal behavior
on the job~
Experience has demonstrated.that the
means available do not suffice even to deal with
notorious malingerers.
We've got to force the authorities to intervene more decisively. Notorious
malingerers must be taken out of. the factories and
given long sentences in forced labor camps in order
to prevent theiir bad examples from further spoiling
the good workers."37
The 1941 annual report of Concordia, to cite another example,
~tated baldly that
"The official measures against malin~erers have failed
completely.
They involve overly complicated procedures
and every imaginable layer of the bureaucracy. When it
takes weeks to punish malingering, punishment cannot be
effective.
Factory discipline---the orily real remedy--suff.ers from the bureaucratic system rather than being
strengthened by it."38
·
Such criticism notwithstanding, the ineffectiveness of the Gestapo
was due to the patent impossibility of imposing direct supervision
over a work force of several.hundred _thousan~ men.

Wartime

attempts to introduce more severe discipline were therefore exercises in futility.
them:

As Dir. Tengelmann interjected at one of

Why discuss the use of re-education camps (Erziehungslager}

when the wood was not available to build them?

39

Discipline, and

production itself, indeed depended on little more than the
i

! '

cooperation of labor with management in maintaining it.
rt was equally important with regard to foreign labor.
I

The

.

hiring of.miners of non-German natidnality had a long and honor-.
able :tradition in the Ruhr and would have provided one obvious
solution to the problem of labor shortage after 1937.* Berlin,

*Another being the recruitment of female
German labor •.. a political near•imp~ssihility.

I
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: i

i!
I'

~

however, never seriously considered it, doubtless because the
:l

operators opposed the use of all foreign labor.

Compelling argu-

I

I
I

ments could be made against it.

i

Extra costs would result from

I

''

training, not to mention the construction and maintenance of

I

I I

separate facilities.
evident.

I

The political risks involved seemed self-

I

I

Experience with dienstverpflichtete (drafted) miners

I
I

!

from the Saar and Silesia, moreover, hardened opposition to the
use of labor from outside the Ruhr.

I

I:

The Saar miners, who were

I

I

I
I'

shifted there at. the outpreak of the war, proved to be an administrative "headache":

j

l

)

I

they complained of "depression," were

less productive than local workers, had to be given non-critical
jobs,· complained about food, and actually demanded maid service
in the barracks.

Of the 325 originally engaged at Gutehoff-

nungshuette, only 24 remained in employment by March 1940, the
rest having l~ft for Fulda, where a colony of displaced Saar
:

workers had formed.

40

I:

't

The "Ost-West Aktion" of Spring 1941,

I

I
I

occasioned by a railroad tie-up in Silesia, brought some 15,000
miners from there to the Ruhr but caused such bitterness that
Arbeitsamt Kattowitz

(Employment Office, Kattowitz) ordered their

return, and "under police protection if necessary."
plaints of the Silesians were legion:

and "treatment as non-Germans."

41

I
I'

j'

The com-

inadequate pay, improper

assignments, lack of separation allowances, housing in barracks,
.

.

i

l

I

The transfer of Aachen miners

to the Ruhr, a sensible proposition from the standpoint of man~
shif1:.. productivity, was cons_idered but dropped by the Wirtschaftsgruppe* in ~pring 1942. 42

i;

I,
I'

The Ge_rman

* Business
'
Group ~oal Mining Industries

occupation of_

21

Belgium and North France made possible the one-time recruitment
of 16,402 unemployed miners.

They were as productive as their

Ruhr counterparts but, thanks to special separation benefits,
earned slightly more and were therefore resented.
year, one-third had ~eft.
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Within a

Experience with DAF-recruited

Italian labor was, by all odds, the worst.

Although hand-picked

and supervised on the job by representatives of the Confederazione
Fascista, they proved, in the wo~ds of Paul Pleiger, to be !lutterly
worthless at the mines."

Of the approximately·s,ooo recruited in

May and June of 1940, one-half simply walked off the job over the
folldwi~g eight months.

A second action, of April 1941, brought

in another 8,000, nine-tenths of whom soon similarly "disappeared .."
In October 1941 the industry requested the repatriation of the
.

; .d

remain er.
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It also rejected out-of-hand offers by both the

Wehrmacht and the Labor Ministry to provide low-cost Polish mine
labor.

It neither agreed to, nor had advance knowledge of,: the

plan launched by Labor Plenipotentiary Fritz Sauckel to draft

several hundred

thousand

slave laborers out of POW camps and

from occupied Europe.
Their influx into the mines presented management with what,
at first, seemed like insuperable administrative problems.

The
)

arrivals were predominantly Soviet :l?OW's, untrained and largely
illiterate •. A substantial number of them were too ill to be
successfuily

11 pumped

up"

(aufgepappelt) for heavy mine labor,

arid so had to.be allowed.to die or languish in detention camps,.
or be directed for. employment .. elsewhere.

By December 1942,

1.

I

'i

: !
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'I

I
1

•
I

!
, I

nonetheless, some 40,000 slave laborers were at work in Ruhr
mines, and the figure doubled over the next twelve months. 45
To house this new component of the labor force, horse barracks
(Pferdestallbaracken) had to be built, four per camp, each of
them surrounded by two tons of accordion wireo

DAF-run guard

I'

units (Wachmannschaft)---whose brutality, corruption, and general

I'

i I

:i

incompetence provided the source of many management complaints--.

were set up to police the encampments.

Hilfswachmannschaften,

, I
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: '
•!I

composed of miners, were set up to do likewise on the job.
policing proved to be a surprisinglX easy task:

I:

But

I,
I

I

;

I

the Soviet
'

slaves, it soon became evident, would work hard if offered a
chance by doing so to survive.

Employing them productively pre-

!

!

I
i

I

I

I

!

I

I'

sented more complicated problems.

i'

Simple procedures, at first

''

I:

improvised, were introduced at the mines to teach tool identification by picture and simple German mining terms.

i'
i:

After· five

days of selection, "pumping-up" and instruction, work would normall~F begin, of course,

at the most menial of jobs, "o .. schnippen,
· .

schleppen, kippen, .•. Berge klauben,
work parties.

11
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as sub-members of German
j;

It thus fell to German Hauer to engage the slave

I'

laborers in productive tasks and also to determine, periodically,
I

whether they met the standard necessary to be kept at work.
Productivity of less than 50% the German level was cause for
referral to a detention center.
German Hauer were generally faithful to the spirit of·Labor
Plenipofentiary Sauckel•s directives regarding the treatment of
foreign labor~

They called for

II. •

•

exploitation to the highest

i

I:
: I
,

\ \
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possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure"
but also expressly forbade"··~ all actions making ... work difficult an9- unnecessarily ur,ibearable and exceeding the hardships
and restrictions [imposed] by the ~ar."

48

Management initially

feared that sympathy towards the slave laborers would undermine
authority.

Betriebsfuehrer Meuthen of Concordia Mine therefore

warned
"All.persons who come into direct contact with the
Russians ••. to pay constant attention .•. to preventing
the authority of the German worker from being undermined by false sentimentality (Geftthlsduselei) since
this. could endanger the successful employment of them.
It is strictly forbidden to give the Russians anything
or do favors for them. Whatever is-necessary for their
successful employment is being handled by the management. Any irregularities involved in traffic with the
Russians must be reported at once. 11 49
Complaints of mistreatment were, however, more frequent than
those of "false sentimentalityi•

(Gefuehlsduselei). A circular

of the Bezirksgruppe of 29 January 1943 reported, for instance,
that
"Both the Wehrrnacht and civil authorities have com_-.
plained repeatedly that treatment of Russian mine
labor leaves much t6 be desired.
B~atings and
general roughness continue. Whether above or below·
ground, humane treatment is completely absent. 1150
German miner complaints about the behavior of the foreign laborers abounded, particularly as, towards the end of the war,
disciplire slackened:
"The extraordinary off~the-job behavior of the
inmates of the Concordia Street i:amp (Cola) was
also complained about.
Our attention was brought
to-circumstances which are incompatible with
orderly camp life. · The Sunday afternoon tea
parties with female Russian workers (Ostarbeiterrinnen)
... must be controlled more tightly and closely
observed. 1151 .
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At the root of German miner resentment was the fact that it was
more difficult to earn one's wage when working together with
unprdductive Ostarbeiter.

Thus Tengelmann's ~erse judgment:

"The inclusion pf Russians in German work parties
has reduced the enthusiasm of our boys to work,
not least of all because of their effect on group
piecework rates."52
Rates were consequently altered in September 1942 to favor German
workers at the expense of the foreign slave laborers:
"To give the German miner an incentive to take a
foreigner into his work-party, the foreigner's f
share should be rated at 5-10% below his estimated productivity.
In other words, when a Russian
can produce at 50% of the German rate, he should
be given a share of 40-50%."53
This measure permitted :average miner wages (Hauerdurchschnittsloehne) to be increased from 8.64 RM to·9.40 RM.
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The wage

table in effect as of 10 January 1944 set the following equivalencies:
Wage rate of
same type of
German worker

POW - share

2

-

4

1.50

.50

10

-

12

6.25

1. 25

24

13.50

2.50

35

20.00

4.00

40
50

-

45

26.00

55

33.00

5.00
6.00

60

-

65

40.00

7.00

75

46.00

8.00

21
30
;,.

Stalag - share

70

In spite·of such treatment,

11
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The Russians," Pleiger reported to

Zentrale Planung on 25 March 1944, "-~~are co~in~ alon~ rnarvel56
ously, especially when we provi<le them.with a bit to eat."

25

He was not, however, about to deny credit for the production
accomplishments in coal to the Ruhr miner:

"I would like to

emphasize once again," he stated on 28 November 1942, "that they
are due almost entirely to the sacrifices of the German miner,
first in training [the foreigners], and then by his longer
hours.

•i
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Thanks, in short, to them-~-and the seemingly

unlimited exploitability of the Russians---it was possible to
raise output from 129.2 million T in 1941-19-12 to 131.2 million T
in 1942-1943, at the same time as the number. of Germans employe,d
· '
58
underground actually decreased from 220,000 to 175,000.
The accomplishments of Ruhr miners between 1937 and 1945
were due to the successful inculcation by management of the notion
that the working man should put politics aside and think only
about production.

It was, of course, the theme of innumerable

propaganda messages, such as "Gutehoffnungshuette Wochenspruch l."
''Wollen wir den Krieg
gewinnen,

ist es Pflicht fuer jedermann,
ganz genau zu ueberlegen
·

wie man noch mehr leisten kann!"

59

The receptivity of labor to such messages must be considered, in
part, an effect of schooling.

The modern German system of

technical education, a product

of

dates from the years after 1933.

management thinking, in fact
Its intellectual father.was

Prof~ssor Karl Arnhold, whose basic ideas were formulated in the
aftermath of the First World War, found prominent business

26
I

I

,i:,
!;
1,

patrons in the mid-1920's, and were taken over as official policy
during the Thiid Reich.

'I

i

,The life purpose of his work was to

overcome "class confl1ct" by.instilling "professional pride,"
or, as he put it, replace "Massenmensch" with "Leistungsmenschen."
By 1923 a couple of hundred thousand pupils were enrolled in
Berufsschulen of his design, including 20,000 in Bergschulen.
Their curricula emphasized integration of coursework into the
production process, cooperation with management, practical examinations, no "overschooling," and no "ideological" studies.

In

1925 Director Albert Voegler, ·subsequent Board Chairman of Verein-

I

''
iI

!'

igte Stahlwerke, set up under Arnhold an industry-:-financed
foundation;'DINTA*, to expand the technical education movement.
'j

After the seizure of power, Arnhold, who had been in touch with
Hitler since.1931, brought DINTA into DAF as the Aint fuer
Bertifserziehung und Betriebsfuehrunq;

The result was an effort

to launch a national career training program (beruf spoli;tische
Planwirtschaft).
fruition:

Arnhold's plans by no means all came to

Hitler's Blitzkrieg strategy, in particular, made a

mockery of industrial manpower projections.
Arnhold's work must be considered successful.

For the r~st,
In 1935 industry

assumed primary responsibility for expan~ing and standardizing
technical education.

The. Ihdustr.ie- und Handelskarnm~r super-

vised it in the discharge of this task.

They also set up and

·administered a new examination procedure for industrial apprentices.

Hundreds of thou~ands of young Germans passed through

this system annually in ~he lat~ 1930's, some 22~000 of them

* Deutsche
Institut fuer.Arbeitsschulung
.
.
.
.

i'
I
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through the Bergschulen.

The Ruhr coal operators looked to them

to provide the nucleus of the Stammbelegschaft---that is to say,
productive and reliable worker~ to serve as a "good example" to
the others and, if necessary, enforce it.

It must be presumed

that they found them.
The history of Ruhr coal compels re-examination of the idea
that "blass conflict"---if understood in any straightforward
sense of the term---provided a brake on Hitler's expansionism.
The contrary, if anything, was the case.· The record coal outputs
from 1937.to 1943 required enormous sacrifices from the.shrinking
number of aging and exhausted German mihers at work underground.
.

I

By historical standards they achieved the impossible.

The regime

can, however, take no credit for this accomplishment.

It failed

equally to plan and in~pire, and its interventions into coal
matters can justly be characterized as incompetent.
tors did much.of the regime's work for it.

The opera-

They failed, of

course, to overcome the shortages of manpower which provided the
main restraint on-increased ou.tputs.

They also refused in some

cases, while being unable in others, to improve material incen~
tives to those at work.

They did, however, manage to stem the

erosion of German miner 6orale and successfully introduce foreign
slave lab_or into the production process.

These accomplishments

required cooperation, and even some initiative,'on the part of
Ge.rman miners.

The success of management in enlisting it

occurred in an industry which, by all odds, provides a "worst
case" in labor relations during the Third Reich.

It is, then,

I

I
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likely that similar results were obtained in more favored
branches of it.

If so~ then they, too, must also be ascribed

in part to the effort begun by industry during Weimar. but put
into practice on a large scale under Hitler to promote "professional pride"

. '

I

(Berufsethos) as a substitute for attachment

to socialist doctrine.

•

I

I

I

I

·'
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